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ABSTRACT
Systematic network monitoring can be the cornerstone for 
the  dependable  operation  of  safety-critical  distributed 
systems. In this paper, we present our vision for informed 
anomaly  detection  through  network  monitoring  and 
resilience  measurements  to  increase  the  operators'  
visibility of ATM communication networks. We raise the 
question  of  how  to  determine  the  optimal  level  of 
automation in this safety-critical context, and we present a 
novel passive network monitoring system that can reveal  
network  utilisation  trends  and  traffic  patterns  in  diverse 
timescales.  Using  network  measurements,  we  derive 
resilience  metrics  and  visualisations  to  enhance  the 
operators' knowledge of the network and traffic behaviour,  
and allow for network planning and provisioning based on 
informed what-if analysis.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C2.3  [Computer-Communication  Networks]:  Network 
Operations - network management, network monitoring.
General Terms
Management, Measurement,  Reliability,  Security.
Keywords
ATM, Network Monitoring, Automation, Safety
INTRODUCTION
Air Traffic  Management  (ATM) systems are  undergoing 
significant  transformations  in  both  the  EU  and  the  US 
through  the  Single  European  Sky  ATM  Research 
(SESAR)  and  the  Next  Generation  Air  Transportation 
System (NextGen), respectively. The transformations will 
see  services  coordinated  over  larger  geographical  areas 
and include integration of services such as radar and flight  
schedules.  These new systems are  required to cope with 
the  predicted  increases  in  air  traffic;  more  than  double 
from 1999 by 2015 in the EU [1]. As air traffic increases, 
so  will  information,  as  network  traffic,  on  the  ATM 
communications  infrastructures  making  these  computer 
networks  more  heavily  used,  meaning  any  problems  or 
anomalies will have a greater potential impact on services. 
To mitigate against these potential disruptions of the ATM 
service, we propose methods to give IT network operators 
and engineers higher visibility and greater  understanding 
of the  underlying  communications infrastructure  through 
effective  network  monitoring  and  visualisation  software. 
To  complement  this  real-time  perspective  we  also 
introduce  pre-emptive  resilience  analysis  techniques, 
based on network measurement,  to identify weak aspects 
of the infrastructure. These techniques introduce simulated 
network  anomalies,  so  that  operators  may  improve  the 
computing infrastructure to reduce the potential impact of 
anomalies in an operational context. We believe that such 
resilience  quantification  will  allow operators  to improve 
reliability  and  provisioning  by  identifying  weak  points. 
Engineering solutions can then be found to strengthen the 
network  as  a  whole,  furthering  our  aim  to  make  ATM 
communication  networks as resilient  and well-monitored 
as  possible  and  therefore  more  resilient  than   other 
communications  systems.  The  holistic  approach  to 
network resilience [26] ensures a greater overall reliability 
since individual changes may strengthen one aspect of the 
system whilst  weakening  it  in  others.  Our research  also 
fits into the broader idea of resilience for ATM services as 
a  whole,  from  human  factors  to  technical  systems.  The 
initial  focus  in  Hollnagel's  concept  of  resilience 
engineering  include  methods  “to  analyse,  measure  and 
monitor  the  resilience  of  organisations”  [12].  We  will 
introduce such methods for the IT networking systems of 
the  overall  ATM  service  which  could  be  part  of  a 
complete resilience evaluation in future.
We present KSWatch, a new passive network monitoring 
system  with  unique  functionality  to  playback  archived 
monitored  data  at  any  temporal  granularity,  with  the 
explicit aim to increase operators' visibility and therefore 
holistic understanding of their network. We also raise the 
questions  of  how  much  automated  network-level 
intervention is a good idea in a safety-critical environment  
and  how effective  automated  anomaly  detection  can  be 
achieved  through the application of existing generalised, 
Internet-wide  techniques  into  the  specific,  less-complex 
networking environment  of ATM systems.  Our vision of 
automated anomaly detection is presented later, where we 
discuss that  an  optimal  first  step  could  be the  real-time 
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notification of anomalous trends for operators to consider 
alongside a policy-based prioritised list of possible causes.
Having  visited  a  major  European  Area  Control  Centre 
(ACC) we believe the aims of this research are the next 
incremental  improvements  from  the  current,  initial 
monitoring solutions and their basic role in detection and 
diagnosis  of  issues  by  network  engineers.  Muller  et  al.  
[21] examined ATM network safety aspects and discusses 
three  hazards:  packet  delay,  loss  and  corruption  also 
stating there are few network-level safety publications. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  will  review  related  case 
studies  of  failure,  discuss  appropriate  approaches  to 
monitoring  in  ATM and present  our monitoring  system. 
Later  sections  introduce  resilience  metrics  and  question 
the role of automation, before concluding the paper.
ATM NETWORK FAILURES
There  have  been  previous  network  failure  incidents  in 
ATM and in interconnected systems which provide strong 
motivation for this research. These incidents have caused 
major  disruptions and their  slow detection  and diagnosis 
have  aggregated  their  impact  in  terms  of  operational 
service,  financial  loss and human factors aspects such as 
confidence  in  the  technology.  While  publicised  high-
impact ATM networking incidents have been infrequent to 
date, since this is a safety-critical domain it is important to 
have  methods  in  place  which  can  reduce  the  impact  of 
problems  when  they  inevitably  occur.  Our  research 
provides ways to more effectively mitigate issues, through 
better ways to visualise, review and prepare for anomalies. 
Case Studies
There are many examples of network systems failure and 
technical  problems  causing  disruption  in  ATM services.  
Two well-known aviation  incidents  were directly  caused 
by  hardware  malfunction  of  Network  Interface  Cards 
(NIC): a major European Airport ATC was shut-down in 
2008 and disruption at Los Angeles International  Airport 
(LAX)  in  2007.  Thankfully,  no  accidents  resulted  from 
these  incidents.  However,  that  does  not  reduce  the 
seriousness of the potential safety implications caused by 
these  IT  network  level  problems.  Further  motivation  is 
evident  from  these  failures;  their   slow  detection  and 
diagnosis  caused  enormous  disruption  and  therefore 
financial  loss  from  loss  of  revenue  to  the  cost  of 
engineers, in one case prolonged over seven weeks. 
The 2002 mid-air collision above Überlingen [9] involved 
technical  changes  which  brought  on  system  degradation 
with unmonitored consequences which, while not directly 
responsible  for  the  accident  [15],  created  a  more 
dangerous  environment.  Therefore,  the  technical  factors 
are  considered  an  initial  point  of  failure  in  the  overall  
incident.  While  this  incident  is  not  directly  related  to 
network resilience,  the case highlights the importance  of 
monitoring  technical  systems within  ATM. With  greater  
understanding of systems resilience and coupling amongst 
technical  services  in  place  in  future,   there  is  a  higher 
likelihood of predicting and more significantly mitigating 
the impact of technical failures.
LAX Network Failure
The  network  problems in  LAX lasted  approximately  10 
hours and caused the US Customs and Border Protection 
computer systems to have average response times of 2-3 
minutes,  two orders  of magnitude  greater  than the  usual 
durations of less than 5 seconds [8]. While this system is 
not  within  ATM,  due  to  the  delays  and  consequent 
congestion of people in waiting in terminals, flights were 
disrupted.  The  case  highlights  how  issues  which  are 
reasonably  easy  to  detect  can  cause  enormous  problems 
when the  right  methods are  not  deployed.  Up to 17,000 
passengers were estimated to have been affected including 
new  arrivals  not  being  allowed  to  disembark  and 
disruptions to international  departures.  While the official 
report  found the cause inconclusive,  later  analysis of the 
outage confirmed that the initial point of failure, which in 
turn caused data to overload the system, was caused by a 
malfunctioning  NIC  [19].  This  case  highlights  the 
enormous  impact  network  problems  can  have,  the 
difficulty in identifying the problem and the length of time 
taken by manual recovery methods. The recommendations 
made by The Department of Homeland Security included 
the  introduction  of  “automatic  error  notifications”  and 
that  staff  should  be  more  effective  when  isolating  and 
resolving outages [8]. Our research will tackle both these 
aims and go further.  The network monitoring system we 
present  gives  network  operators  the  opportunity  to 
increase  their  understanding  of  the  network,  perceiving 
trends and behavioural  patterns by replaying data.  These 
trends  can  be  used  to  simulate  failure  scenarios,  by 
understanding typical  behaviours and then simulating the 
introduction  of  an  anomaly  through  resilience 
measurement  techniques  which  will  allow  policies  and 
predictions  to  be  made  about  network  vulnerabilities. 
These contributions could lead towards the automation of 
detecting  vulnerabilities  and  problems.  Another 
recommendation,  which  acts  as  yet  more  motivation  for 
this research, was the belief by staff that there is “a high 
risk that a similar outage could occur at other [US] ports 
of  entry”.  This  shows  negligence  in  understanding  the 
importance of the monitoring and resilience of networked 
systems, despite their criticality to all ATM services, even 
within an isolated but interconnected system.
European Airport ATC Network Failure
In 2008, a European airport ATC system experienced a far 
more disruptive and prolonged networking failure.  While 
this incident had a very similar cause to the LAX network 
failure,  the  effects  had  a  greater  impact  upon  ATM 
services. The root cause of an intermittent faulty NIC and 
the subsequent error in systems attempting to mitigate the 
issue  led  to  anomalous  manifestations  including  ATM 
losing  track  of  planes  or  associated  flight  information 
across  several  different  periods.  The  problems  persisted 
for  seven  weeks  with  sustained  durations  of  normal 
behaviour.  These  ongoing  problems  caused  delays, 
restrictions in air traffic such as the avoidance of aircraft 
in  arrival  holding  patterns  in  case  a  problem  occurred,  
irregularities  in  information  presented  on  Air  Traffic 
Control  Officers'  (ATCO)  screens,  and  some  periods  of 
complete  closure  [13].  The recommendations  by Thales, 
the  ATM  system  supplier,  and  the  national  aviation 
authority  were  “that  additional  network  monitoring  be 
undertaken  and  that  monitoring  tools  and  a  passive 
analyser  be  installed  on  the  system  to  aid  the  early  
identification of similar malfunctions” and “the possibility 
of other potential improvements in the network design in 
order  to  prevent  a  re-occurrence”  [13].  Adding  network 
monitoring was central to the detection of the faulty NIC. 
This is similar to the LAX fault recommendation [8] that 
more network diagnostic tools should be provided.
In each  of  these  situations,  Reason's  widely  cited  Swiss 
Cheese  failure  model  [24]  applies  since  these  were  not 
single  points  of  failure,  but  a  series  of  problems  which 
involved  a  root  technical  fault.  We  argue  that  in  these 
cases,  while  network-level  problems  are  unavoidable, 
aspects  of  network  automation  such  as  monitoring  with 
automated  analysis  and  notification  of  anomalies,  could 
stop  such  problems  persisting  and  remaining  unknown, 
and instead be detected very quickly.
These incidents are rare. However, this research provides 
a   method  to  limit  the  impact  of  such  faults  and  many 
other  potential  disruptions  by  increasing  the  operators' 
visibility  of  their  network  and  highlighting  weak  points 
through resilience measurement. Networks can be affected 
by factors beyond hardware malfunctions.  Circumstances 
such  as  connection  failure,  natural  disasters  rendering 
parts  of  the  infrastructure  unavailable  and  malicious 
cyber-attacks  are  all  potential  threats  to  safety-critical  
ATM  services.  Automated  anomaly  analysis  detection 
would  be  applicable  for  each  of  these  anomalous 
classifications.  With  automated  anomaly  detection  the 
process of detection and remediation could be achievable 
in real-time. Our first steps in achieving self-management  
through monitoring and resilience measurements follow.
NETWORK MONITORING 
As discussed earlier,  successful  monitoring of a network 
provides  the  operators  with  many  advantages  when 
making  management  decisions,  from  shaping  traffic 
policies to the architectural design. Like many enterprise 
networks,  ATM  communication  networks  could  be 
improved  given  adequate  monitoring  and  an 
understanding  of  what  these  measurements  mean. 
Measurements  can  provide  an  understanding  of  patterns 
and trends in behaviour. By using knowledge of the traffic  
behaviour  less  immediately  apparent  aspects  such  as 
stronger  resilience  or  reliability  can  be  improved,  for 
example by taking the measurements of a busy period and 
simulating a device or link becoming disconnected. Later 
we will show resilience measurement examples which can 
better quantify this abstract metric.
Many network monitoring systems provide a basic subset 
of measurements.  However,  by using the information we 
collect  more  effectively  and  at  an  aggregated  level  we 
have  created  a  novel  automated  network  monitoring 
system. Given the unique environment of ATM networks, 
we  believe  this  bespoke  system,  introduced  in  a  later  
section,  will  be  the  first  step  towards  a  real-time 
automated anomaly detection system by providing a better 
view of network behaviour.
Passive Monitoring
Network  monitoring  is  a  broad  topic  and  covers  many 
techniques. Measuring a network allows operators to gain 
an understanding of its behaviour and from this perform 
various  tasks  from  problem  diagnosis  and  anomaly 
detection to traffic shaping, provisioning and optimisation.
Measurement  can  be  performed  passively  and  actively.  
Active  measurements  are performed by adding traffic  to 
the network. The measurements are then made based on 
the  behaviour  of  the  network  with  this  stimulus  traffic.  
Due to  the  behavioural  interference  of  additional  traffic 
with  the  operational  traffic,  its  wide-spread  use  is 
unsuitable  for  ATM  systems.  Contrastingly,  passive 
monitoring is unobtrusive and measurements are taken by 
observing  operational  traffic.  Different  aspects  of  the 
network can be measured such as the traffic, performance 
and  structure.  Examining  each  of  these  gives  more 
measurement options.
Metrics  can  be derived  passively  from traffic  at  various 
levels,  perhaps by using switches with mirrored ports as 
seen  in  Figure  1.  Mirrored  ports  or  network  taps  are 
beneficial for a safety-critical environment as there can be 
no  interference  with  operational  traffic  because  these 
methods  observe  the  passing  traffic  without  interaction.  
The  most  standardised  passive  network  monitoring 
technique  is  Simple  Network  Management  Protocol 
(SNMP), first defined in 1990 (RFC1157). The majority of 
devices  have  this  protocol  built  in  and  therefore  no 
additional  hardware  requirements  are  necessary,  unlike 
mirrored ports or network taps. SNMP-based monitoring is 
Figure 1: Mirrored port in switch for passive monitoring   
Figure 2: SNMP Internet Architecture Model
at  the  highest  level  where  traffic  is  counted  at  an 
aggregated interface level  on agents, such as switches or 
routers,  and is then polled  by management  systems,  see 
Figure 2. The protocol examines Management Information 
Bases (MIBs) which structure Object IDentifiers (OIDs) in 
a hierarchy. These OIDs hold the aggregated information 
about the interfaces on the device and include counters for 
the number  of:  packets,  bytes  and packets  with Unicast,  
Multicast  or  Broadcast  type  sent  and  received,  and  the 
number of discarded packets. These  measurements show 
the values between two connected devices. Figure 2 shows 
managers which poll the MIBs on managed devices using 
SNMP.  Asynchronous  trap  notifications  may  also  pass 
from agents to managers e.g. the sysUpTime value. 
SNMPv3  (RFC3411)  is  the  latest  version  and  is  a  full 
Internet  standard  with  additional  security  over  previous 
versions of the protocol.
Traffic with different sources may pass through common 
links  and  devices  en  route  to  their  possibly  distinct  
destinations. Traffic can be grouped into flows based upon 
common characteristics,  typically based upon its Internet 
Protocol  (IP)  source  and  destination  addresses  and  its 
transport  protocol  type.  The  transport  protocol  is 
commonly either the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
or  User  Datagram  Protocol  (UDP)  depending  upon  the 
traffic requirements of the applications which are sending 
the  communications.  These  protocols  have  different 
properties  most  noticeably  with  respect  to  the  time 
required  to  establish  a  connection  between  two 
applications  and  the  procedure  for  dealing  with  lost 
packets, e.g. whether or not to retransmit the information.  
Flow measurements  can  derive  information  such  as  the 
start and stop times of specific flows, their size and their  
route. These measurements give more details of the traffic  
behaviour and can be considered more traffic-centric than 
SNMP measurements which are device-centric. 
The most  detailed  level  of  traffic  specific  monitoring  is 
done at the level  of individual packets. This is the finest 
granularity  available  and  gives  metrics  on  individual 
packets such as its timing and other information available 
in the packet's header including number of bytes, protocol, 
whether the packet is part of a series,  its unique number 
and  its  type.  For  high-speed  links  there  is  often  a 
requirement  for  additional  hardware  support  in  order  to 
passively measure a large volume of information. 
Advanced Technical Methods
Passive measurement  relies on observation  points.  There 
is  much  research  work  involving  the  combination  of 
network monitoring with network tomography; the process 
of taking a set of monitoring points in a network and then 
attempting to infer from these locations what the network 
behaviour  is at  other  locations  in  the network.  Example  
applications  of  tomography  include:  inferring  routing 
topologies  from  end-to-end  measurements  [14],  for 
finding  Distributed  Denial  of  Service  (DDoS)  attack 
sources [7] or earlier work in estimating TCP packet loss 
ratios of links within a network [3]. Network tomography 
and methods which use this technique could be useful for 
ATM  since  the  number  of  monitoring  points  can  be 
reduced  whilst  retaining  the  ability  to  detect  issues.  If 
packet  loss  ratios  are  observed  and  improved  this  may 
translate to high-level  ATM efficiencies.  For example,  if 
packets are lost in air-ground-air communication streams, 
this requires repetition of the communication. Aggregating 
the  impact  of  improving  packet  loss  rates  across  every 
communication  would  increase  the  reliability  and 
efficiency noticeably. 
Other  relevant  work  has  considered  the  use  of  highly 
efficient  monitoring  at  the  end-points  of  a  network  in 
order to derive performance [22] through new techniques.  
The  technique  used  in  this  example  is  to  piggyback 
measurement  data  with  operational  traffic,  in  individual  
packets, and it does not introduce additional packets. It is 
therefore  not  active  measurement  and  is  more  closely 
aligned  with  the  ideology  of  passive  measurements' 
unobtrusive approach to measuring operational traffic. 
At  the  level  of  flow-based  measurements  there  is  also 
considerable  work in developing techniques to solve  the 
key high-level networking issues. Flow-based metrics can 
be used in Intrusion Detection (ID) for classifying network 
attacks [11] or in anomaly detection and classification [2].  
The flow-based anomaly detection work is centred on the 
observation that  a larger  fraction of anomalous traffic  is 
concentrated in a small fraction of flows. This concept is 
similar  to  that  of  tomography  where  there  is  inference  
taken  from a  subset  of  monitored  values,  in  this  case  a  
subset of flows as opposed to a subset of monitored device  
interfaces, such as the ingress or egress of a network or its 
end-points.  At  the  most  granular  level,  deep  packet 
inspection  is  often  used  for  firewalls  and  security  type 
applications such as intrusion detection. Recent work [25], 
has evaluated increased efficiency in this computationally 
intensive process, particularly for high speed networking, 
in the context of intrusion detection and security for cloud 
computing.  Each  of  these  techniques  could  bring 
advantages  for  ATM  whether  through  an  increase  in 
security through ID, anomaly detection using flow metrics 
or  deriving  performance  efficiently  throughout  the 
network using traffic piggyback methods.
Using Measurements for Network Operations
Measurements  allow  network  operators  to  gain  a  better 
understanding of their network. This means they can have 
planned  rational  responses  to  problems and be aware  of 
the  impact  of  their  decisions  as  opposed  to  rushed 
intervention and unknown causes and effects when trouble 
shooting  and  resolving  issues.  All  of  the  monitoring 
metrics we discussed can be used to significantly enhance  
anomaly detection,  network optimisation and to improve 
performance,  e.g.  through  monitoring  flows  it  could  be 
found that bottlenecks exist and therefore the architecture 
could  be  modified  to  improve  performance  or,  through 
deep  individual  packet  inspection,  anomalous  malicious 
traffic  could be seen and rejected,  similar  to the actions 
performed by firewalls. This is true for any network, but 
ATM  communication  networks  have  requirements  and 
advantages in comparison to typical enterprise networks or 
the Internet generally. ATM traffic is more contained than 
Internet-wide  traffic,  due  to  fewer  traffic  types,  lower 
utilisation, a simpler architecture and a single purpose and 
set of applications. This reduction in complexity presents 
opportunities,  due  to  more  apparent  norms in  traffic,  in 
automation which we will  discuss later,  however from a 
monitoring  perspective  this  isolated  environment  allows 
for highly visible and well understood network behaviour. 
The  motivation  for  such  an  insight  and  understanding 
would be strong for any network for generic reasons such 
as  provisioning,  optimisation  and  anomaly  detection. 
However,  these  benefits  are  enhanced  given  the  safety-
critical  domain  and  therefore  the  desire  for  reliability, 
transparency and understanding in all of its aspects.
We propose automated monitoring, rather than automated 
resolution of issues. Automatic resolution adds complexity 
and  can  lead  to  unknown  problems  in  the  system 
escalating  into  run  away  results  which  compound  each 
other  and  make  the  situation  worse.  We  believe  that  
automated  monitoring  in  combination  with  automated 
anomaly  detection  in  real-time  with  notifications  to  the 
operators would be an optimal next step for ensuring the 
underlying  infrastructure  of  ATM  services  is  well  safe-
guarded against potential problems.
As we  stated  earlier,  from  our  discussion  with  a  major 
European  ACC  we  have  seen  that  some  monitoring  is 
present  in  ATM systems.  However,  while  these  systems 
provide some of the basic measurements we reviewed in 
this  section,  the  more  advanced  aspects  as  well  as  the 
visualisation and presentation of this information could be 
improved in order to better aid the operators and engineers 
in their network-level tasks.
KSWatch Monitoring Sytem
In this section, we present the design and implementation 
of  KSWatch:  an  extensible  network  monitoring  and 
visualisation system that can seamlessly integrate diverse 
functionality,  and  can  therefore  form  the  basis  for  a 
comprehensive  network  monitoring  and  management 
framework.  The  system  eliminates  much  of  the  data 
redundancy  found in a  typical  set-up;  it  provides  for  an 
increased  storage  and  visualisation  efficiency,  and  also 
offers  features  like  the  archive  playback  of  network 
utilisation.  Using  this  system's  unique  functionality 
improves  the  network  operators'  understanding  of  their 
network,  as  we  have  found  from  our  discussions  with 
those  who  currently  use  it.  KSWatch  also  gives  the 
operator a clear picture of the network topology, the most 
highly-used partitions in the network and any bottlenecks,  
and therefore,  vulnerabilities  in the  infrastructure.  These 
aspects  and  their  associated  metrics  underpin  the 
resilience techniques we will discuss later.
We are aware of the use of the Zabbix1 monitoring system 
in some ATM systems. Anecdotal  evidence suggests that 
engineers use the system to confirm, some time later, the 
existence  of  a  problem  they  have  already  found.  This 
suggests that a far more useful tool for engineers would be 
the  automation  of  detecting  and  notifying  problems  in 
real-time  as  opposed  to  relaying  information.  However, 
relayed  information  is  still  significantly  useful  when 
presented correctly with advanced functionality as we do.
Implementation
While  our  system2 uses  the  common underlying  passive 
monitoring  technique  of  SNMP to  gather  network  data,  
the functionality  it  offers is far  more useful  than that  of 
existing  systems.  Functionality  includes:  graphing  and 
tabular statistics of network devices and connections e.g.  
CPU  utilisation  or  number  of  lost  traffic  packets.  This 
system also offers the ability to switch monitoring on and 
off  with  a  single  click,  which  is  beneficial  if  system 
resources  are  needed  elsewhere  e.g.  when  performing 
system  tests.  The  main  benefit  of  this  system,  is  the 
network  weathermap tool.  The  user  interface  is  seen  in 
Figure 3 with options for animated playback displayed on 
the right side. This tool shows the topology of the network 
with  colour  graded  connections  between  devices  which 
equate to the level of link utilisation. This overview of the 
network  can  be  viewed  by  the  operator  using  live  or 
archived  data for an automated visualisation  of the time 
period  specified.  This  means  operators  can  review  the 
build  up  to  a  particular  event  and  analyse  busy periods 
offline.  The  speed  and  period  of  the  playback  are  fully 
customisable allowing the operator to view, for example,  
hourly snapshots of the past three months or every minute 
1 Zabbix Monitoring System, http://www.zabbix.com
2 KSWatch System, http://dcs.gla.ac.uk/~kyle/kswatch.pdf
Figure 3: User interface for KSWatch monitoring system
in  the  last  hour.  This  information  is  invaluable  when 
diagnosing  problems,  considering  network  provisioning 
and  policy-making.  Our  specific  interest  of  categorising 
normal  behaviour and vulnerabilities  for  automated  self-
management and resilience metrics are also only possible 
with such highly monitored perspectives.
Application
Using our earlier case study of the European ATC network 
failure  as  motivation,  here  we  will  explain  how  the 
deployment  of  our system can  significantly  improve the 
network  staff's  understanding  of  their  network.  The  key 
aspects which made the NIC failure problem difficult  to 
detect  were  the  intermittency  and  the  lack  of  sufficient  
network monitoring. 
With our system in place prior to the onset of a problem, 
such as traffic flooding, the normal behaviour prior to the 
incident and build up to problematic conditions would be 
captured  and  measured.  Using  our   specialised 
functionality,  the  data  for  this  period  could  be  replayed 
and  analysed.  This  replay  could  be  compared  with 
automated  visualisations  of  similar  periods  such  as  the 
weeks  prior  at  the  same  time  or  other  durations  with 
similar  traffic  levels.  This  would  give  engineers  a 
significantly  more  informed  position  to  begin  their 
diagnosis than having to work with measurements  taken 
only after the onset of a problem. A self-managed system 
may  be  able  to  go  further  still  and  at  the  point  of  a 
problem occurring,  be able to detect  the exact  source of 
the  anomalous  traffic.  Despite  the  benefits  of  hindsight, 
without  detailed  monitoring  information  available  from 
the time of the European ATC failure, it is impossible to 
state  if  the  deployment  of  this  system  would  have 
improved  the  situation.  However,  the  official 
recommendations  strongly  suggests  that  this  research 
would  assist  problem  detection  and  diagnosis  in  this 
environment. 
Our  system  is  currently  running  on  the  Kiwi  Advanced 
Research  and  Education  Network  (KAREN)3.  This 
deployment has shown this system is fully functional and 
has shown the operators ways to improve the efficiency of 
their traffic policies. These improvements have since been 
made and monitored. The system continues to run and the 
functionality  is  being  regularly  extended  due  to  the 
flexible architecture and data management scheme.
KSWatch  provides  operators  with  perspectives  which 
highlight  trends  and  patterns  in  network  behaviour  over 
time.  By  examining  these  trends,  the  network  and  the 
services  running  on  the  network  are  better  understood. 
When considering resilience,  these trends are the starting 
point from which problematic scenarios can be simulated.  
Standard  operational  data  will  be  present  when  failures 
occur and therefore it  is important  to know the impact a 
range of failures could have on operational traffic before 
they  occur  so  that  resilience  can  be  pre-emptively 
improved with careful and adequate consideration.
3 KAREN, http://www.karen.net.nz
RESILIENCE
With  monitoring  in  place  such  as  that  provided  by 
KSWatch, it is possible for network engineers to recreate  
events, simulate potential threats and model the resilience 
of the infrastructure.  Network resilience  is central  to the 
primary aim of the ATM service: to maintain and provide 
reliable services resisting challenges which may occur. 
Since the  Communications Network Services  (CNS) and 
network data are a fundamental  part of the ATM service 
operation, it is vital that there is a greater understanding of 
their resilience. This in turn impacts upon the resilience of 
the ATM service  overall.  There  are many considerations 
with resilience, discussed in depth by Fry [10] and Cholda 
[6], which include the idea that resilience requirements for 
different  services  may  differ  despite  the  fact  that  these 
services  run  on  the  same  networks.  Using  flow-based 
monitoring,  services  can  be  distinguished  and  the 
individual resilience of an ATM service calculated.
Network  resilience  can  be  quantified  over  many  factors 
including:  link  utilisation,  packet  loss  and  connectivity. 
These  example  factors  link  with  the  SNMP monitoring 
OIDs of:  bytes sent  and received and discarded packets.  
This  means  operational  data  can  be  used  in  resilience 
simulation  to  provide  comparable  measurements  of  the 
impact of problems. ATM networks have a high level  of 
redundancy  in  their  infrastructures  and  often  have 
complete  back  up  network  architectures.  This  makes 
connectivity  metrics  more  suitable  for  future  research. 
While  there  may  be  bottlenecks  or  weak  points  at  the 
connections to the redundant architectures it is likely these 
will  be specific  to each ATM operation.  However,  there 
are  common  parameters  which  will  affect  the  network 
resilience of any ATM system regardless of the topology. 
Since ATM is a real-time service, any degradation in the 
network which affects an application's timely delivery of 
information  is  unacceptable.  Therefore,  we  have 
considered  which  resilience  metrics  would  be  most 
valuable to model initially and to understand their impact.  
These  are  the  amount  of  disruption  in  the  network, 
(represented  by the available  capacity  on each link) and 
the amount of packet loss. 
We  have  run  simulations  based  on  an  ATM 
communications  network  experiencing  a  NIC  network 
card failure similar  to that  encountered  by the European 
ATC  centre,  by  extracting  technical  details  from  the 
analytical  reports.  These  simulations  will  be  used  as  a 
demonstration  of  how  to  produce  example  resilience 
envelopes which would typically be performed prior to an 
incident in order to understand its potential impact.
Resilience (Metric) Envelopes
Resilience  envelopes  were  developed  by  the  ResiliNets4 
networking  project  at  The  University  of  Kansas  and 
Lancaster  University.  These  graphs  show the  upper  and 
lower  bounds  of  a  specific  resilience  metric  plotted 
against  predetermined  failures  in  the  network.  It  is 
therefore important  when considering resilience issues to 
contemplate  all  potential  threats  as  well  as  the  metrics 
4 ResiliNets Wiki, https://wiki.ittc.ku.edu/resilinets
which  could affect  reliable  performance  in  the  network. 
The  information  visualised  can  then  be  used  to  make 
improvements to the network in anticipation of potential 
issues  in  order  to  mitigate  their  impact.  The  effects  of 
these  improvements  can  then  be  measured  by  re-
modelling the resilience envelopes and observing whether 
the  envelope  range  has  improved.  Changes  for  one 
resilience  aspect  may also affect  others,  perhaps through 
modifying  the  topology.  We  therefore  propose  that  an 
implementation  of  this  research  would  involve  an 
automated sandbox test-bed environment where simulated 
changes could be rerun automatically against all resilience 
parameters  with notifications of any other  measurements 
which were degraded as a result of the change. 
The  resilience  envelope  concept  is  a  component  of  the 
larger  ResiliNets  strategy  of  D2R2+DR (defend,  detect, 
remediate,  recover,  diagnose,  refine)  which  is  discussed 
more  comprehensively  along  with  principles  and 
approaches in these works [26, 27]. 
The  core  idea  is  to  have  real-time  network  resilience 
through successful  iterations  of  each  of  these  high-level  
concepts.  Our research aims to progress the defence  and 
detection elements of this strategy in ATM systems. 
Experimental Setup
We have used the popular network research software ns-35 
to  simulate  an  ATM communications  network,  with  an 
accurate  example  topology,  and  traffic  flow  between 
applications.  We have chosen to base our simulation  on 
the case  study regarding  network card failure  since it  is 
widely  known  and  is  the  best  recorded  example  of  the 
impact of such a problem. This technique can be used for  
any set of anomalous events. In our experiment we tracked 
the  remaining  free  capacity  on links and the  number  of 
packets dropped, averaged across the network as a whole.  
This reverts back to the concept of considering resilience 
of  the  network  in  a  holistic  way.  However,  an 
implemented  test  suite  of these  measurements  could see 
simulations and resilience  envelopes  produced on a  per-
link or per-flow basis depending on the visibility desired. 
5 NS-3: Network Simulator, http://www.nsnam.org
These  chosen  metrics  were  mapped  against  the 
introduction  of  failures.  We  simulated  the  hardware 
failure  of  a  NIC  flooding  event  by  introducing  a  UDP 
application  which  produces  packets  without  considering 
the  establishment  of  connections  or  retransmission.  To 
show the escalation of resilience, we increase the number  
of  failures  over  various  simulations  or  in  the  simulated 
context,  an increase  in the volume of anomalous traffic.  
All  the  experiments  were  repeated  and  the  results 
averaged across numerous simulations.  There is variance 
introduced  in the results from the random start  and stop 
time  of normal  traffic  applications.  This  means in  some 
simulations,  more  normal  traffic  will  be  present  in  the 
network when the failure occurs causing a greater impact.  
Similarly, the best case may be when the failures occurred 
at the period of quietest normal activity due to the random 
timing of events across the simulations. 
Simulated ATM Resilience Envelopes
In Figure 4 we see the resilience envelopes produced from 
our  simulations.  Assumptions  regarding  network  traffic 
utilisation were made when creating these measurements 
since  no archived  monitoring  traffic  was available  from 
the  time of the incident.  However,  the benefits  of using 
this  measurement  concept  to  pre-emptively  validate  and 
gain reassurances in the resilience of an ATM network are 
apparent from these examples.
It  can  be  seen  that  there  is  a  clear  trend  between  the 
number  of  failures  and  the  network  disruption  for  both 
metrics.  A  consideration  when  examining  the  above 
envelopes,  particularly  the  dropped  packets  example,  is 
that for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications, 
dropped packets in the stream of between 5 - 10 % affects  
the quality significantly [20]. With a single failure on our 
basic simulation this range is reached even in the best case  
scenario.  Clearly  such  a  failure  would  cause  enormous 
disruption  in  this  real-time  safety-critical  environment. 
For other networked communications,  retransmission can 
be achieved without as much disruption.  This is because 
when  there  are  delays  or  portions  missing  in  audio  or 
video,  humans  will  find  it  difficult  to  interpret  the 
meaning  as it  is heard or viewed.  However,  in an ATM 
context  any  delays  through  packet  loss  and  their 
consequent  retransmission  will  be  apparent  since  the 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Resilience metrics for utilisation by NIC failure
service operates in real-time. Data which is neither audio 
nor  video  can  tolerate  more  delay.  Given  a  disruptive 
scenario,  these  will  still  suffer  significant  delays.  The 
failures  we  model  here  are  infrequent  as  are  other 
potential  anomalies.  However,  the  entire  ATM  service 
operation  is  totally  reliant  on  the  power  systems  and 
network  level  operation  to  deliver  information  and  so 
additional safe-guards at this granularity are of significant  
benefit.  The back up systems in place  for power supply 
are  automated  and  highly  sophisticated,  to  deliver 
continuous  power  from  a  point  of  failure  and  whilst 
transitioning among different power sources. The network 
infrastructures  also  have  high  redundancy  with  often 
numerous physical  connections to avoid loss of services. 
However,  currently  the  process  of  detecting  anomalous 
network  behaviour  is  less  sophisticated  than  what  we 
present  here.  We believe  the application of this research 
would  increase  the  overall  resilience  of  ATM  services. 
The  left  envelope  in  Figure  4  shows  the  relationship 
between the available link capacity in the network and the  
number of failures, or quantity of anomalous traffic in our 
simulations. 
This  means  that  a  very  severe  single  flooding  incident  
could have the impact shown as though it were four less 
intensive  failures  occurring  simultaneously.  Assuming 
approximately  30%  utilisation  across  the  links  in  the 
network under normal circumstances, the introduction of a 
failure  grossly  reduces  the  available  link  capacity  from 
approximately 70% down to on average nearly 50%. This 
reduction  is  significant  since  this  pushes  the  network 
towards  a  state  where  additional  resources  would  be 
required in order to ensure reliability of services with an 
increase in traffic. This is because high utilisation does not 
allow new services to initiate with a guarantee of reliable  
performance.  Existing  services  could  also  require 
additional  available  capacity,  for  example  if  a  nearby 
airport was closed due to weather and a significant level  
of  traffic  was  redirected  to  the  affected  ATM  service.  
There is therefore a need to know the available capacity at 
any  given  time  which  can  be  provided  by  KSWatch 
monitoring.  These  examples  are  uncommon yet  possible 
and  with  an  ever-increasing  demand  for  air  travel  and 
expansion  of  air  traffic  predicted,  necessary  additional 
resilience  can  be  found  by  ensuring  the  underlying 
fundamental CNS are highly visible and well understood. 
As a basis for future work, we have abstractly considered 
the classification of ATM CNS specific threats, similar to 
the abstract taxonomy by Plonka [23].
ATM Potential Network Threats
We  have  considered  a  subset  of  all  potential  network 
challenges  which  are  applicable  on  a  typical  ATM 
communications  architecture.  As  we  mentioned  in  our 
motivation,  there  is  a  diverse  range  of  potential  threats 
from low-level issues such as hardware faults to high-level  
events  e.g.  natural  disasters.   These  threats  also  span  a 
wide  range  at  a  lower  technical  level.  While  some  will  
impact in a very noticeable manner such as a link failing,  
others are  likely  to be less apparent  such as a hardware 
malfunction.  The  traffic  types  will  vary  as  well  from 
potentially  corrupt  information  from  a  single  source 
through a  software  fault  to  enormous  crippling  volumes 
from different sources via a DDoS. 
Future  work  will  consider  the  taxonomy  of  these  more 
closely and with a greater emphasis on their impact in an 
ATM context  at  a  technical  level,  along  with  potential  
detection  techniques  from  the  observation  of  their 
identifying  characteristics.  Considerable  related  work 
exists  on  this  topic  but  often  they  examine  a  minimal 
number  of  technical  parameters  when  creating  the 
classifications. Such work is also not specialised to ATM 
systems and therefore is unable to exploit the benefits  we 
discussed earlier.
With such a variety of potential anomalies the concept of 
automated detection is difficult. However, there is a strong 
desire for this level of self-management in networks since 
problems can be noticed more rapidly. In the next section 
we  will  raise  the  open  question  of  what  would  be  the 
optimal level of self-management in ATM communication 
networks  and  consider  how  to  approach  any  level  of 
automation in this context.
CONSIDERING AUTOMATION
Adding  automation  to  a  system  adds  to  its  complexity.  
This  is  not  desirable  for  interconnected,  safety-critical  
systems  since  the  number  of  potential  points  of  failure 
increases.  Therefore  complete  network self-management,  
where  the  network  automatically  looks  after  its  own 
configuration,  optimisation, protection and healing is not 
yet viable. As we have suggested however, some elements 
of automation could prove invaluable  such as automated 
anomaly detection.  The level  of self-management  in this 
case  would  be  the  detection  and  notification  of  what  is 
considered anomalous traffic  for operators and engineers 
to consider.  Of course false-positives and false-negatives 
may arise and users of any implementation would have to 
be aware of such possibilities and not be fully reliant  on 
such a system. It would be optimal to have such a system 
aid the  Network Operations Centre  (NOC) team in their 
activities  and possibly provide  an early  warning for any 
anomalies.  With  any  system  automation,  high  visibility 
and a well  understood operation are vital  before trusting 
its reliability. 
Given desirable automation in the detection and protection 
aspects  of  ATM  systems,  the  next  question  is  how  to 
achieve  such  a  vision.  Considerable  networked  systems 
research  has  investigated  anomaly  detection  on  Next 
Generation  Networks  (NGN) and the  Internet.  Lim [18] 
provides a good overview, with a security perspective, of 
the  taxonomy  of  different  detection  techniques  which 
shows the variance  in existing approaches but highlights 
that research in this area is still ongoing. Flow sampling is 
an  emerging  technique  for  anomaly  detection  and 
increasing  efficiency  is  being  derived  [2],  albeit  in  this 
case,  on  specific,  well-defined  anomalies.  Improved 
visualisations of network behaviour for engineers to gain 
better  perspectives,  such  as  those  in  our  monitoring 
system,  are  also  a  widely  accepted  concept.  Algorithms 
have been proposed to better visualise traffic data for the 
purpose of understanding anomalies by Celenk [5]. This is 
an anomaly estimation technique, but it highlights existing 
work in this area which attempts to reduce the obscurity of 
the network, particularly in terms of problem diagnosis. A 
different  approach  [16]  is  the  use  of  histogram-based 
anomaly  detection  whereby  normal  flows  are  classified 
and modelled  according  to  their  features.  Appropriately,  
this  work  highlights  the  LAX  incident  as  motivation. 
However, the common problem of defining normal traffic 
is present with this solution since it is based on anomaly-
free  training  data,  which  cannot  be guaranteed  and it  is 
aided  by  administrators  labelling  known  anomalous 
traffic. 
Characteristics of ATM Networks and the Internet
These ideas are relevant since the statistical characteristics 
of Internet traffic are not so disperse from those of ATM 
CNS.  As  a  starting  point,  the  hardware  involved  is 
standard  in  terms  of  switches,  routers  and  devices.  The 
physical cabling infrastructure is also common with either 
Ethernet  or  fibre  optic  links.  Topologies  differ  amongst 
networks,  however  the  components  and  general 
architectures  and  their  behavioural  characteristics  are 
known  such  as  trees,  rings  or  interconnected  meshes. 
Ethernet  forwarding  and  Media  Access  Control  (MAC) 
addressing are the same underlying low-level method. 
The  protocols  are  also  shared  from the  standard  SNMP 
management agents to the transport protocols such as TCP 
or  UDP  and  the  ubiquitous  Internet  Protocol  (IP). 
Therefore,  the only significant  difference  which remains 
between  the  types  of  networked  system  is  the  traffic 
behaviour, which is defined by the applications which are 
running.  By  examining  these  more  closely  we  see  that 
ATM services, whilst sharing common characteristics with 
Internet-wide  networks,  are  far  less  complex.  Fewer 
services, with distinct roles, such as network traffic being 
relayed  from  radar  sites,  will  be  more  predictable  than 
other  enterprise  traffic  which  may  include  competing, 
simultaneous applications such as video streaming,  peer-
to-peer  services,  Virtual  Private  Network  (VPN) traffic,  
viruses and active measurements. This environment is far 
less predictable than ATM systems which could even have 
pre-determinable elements with correct  modelling. While 
ATM network traffic  will experience bursts, for example 
in  the  case  of  additional  flights  arriving  due  to  a  near  
neighbour closing,  these  bursts  will  be of  similar  traffic 
type, are likely to be proportional  to aircraft,  and always 
have  an  upper  limit:  either  the  maximum  number  of 
aircraft  which  can  be  safely  managed  in  the  ATM's 
domain or the maximum capacity able to be scheduled to 
arrive and depart at a given airport. Neither of these limits 
are  likely  to  exceed  the  utilisation  of  the  network.  The 
anomalies  which  can  affect  both  types  of  networked 
system are also similar.  Our case studies of faulty  NICs 
are  essentially  instances  of  network  flooding.  While 
“normal” Internet traffic is more complex behaviourally, a 
flooding  event  will  still  show  the  same  characteristics, 
perhaps less noticeably, as a network flooding event in an 
ATM  networked  system.  It  is  therefore  reasonable  to 
consider  equivalent  techniques  for  automated  anomaly 
detection  on Internet-wide  networks  since  they  are  of  a 
statistically similar nature in terms of hardware, protocols 
and anomalous traffic characteristics. The differences are 
apparent in the applications and services on ATM systems 
which  will  make  the  process  of  automatically  detecting 
anomalies more viable than in other networks. 
It is a commonly held belief that SNMP monitoring alone 
is  too  coarse-grained  for  effective  classification  for 
anomaly detection on Internet-wide networks [4]. Recent 
work has progressed SNMP-based anomaly detection [17]. 
In each of these cases the results are at best a reduction in  
false-positives or provide only reasonable accuracy which 
supports  the  claim  that  SNMP is  too  coarse-grained  for 
such traffic behaviour. However, this conclusion may not 
hold  true  in  an  ATM context  with  different  application 
characteristics  making it  worth exploring.  If future work 
proves  inconclusive  we  can  adapt  our  methodology  to 
consider  some  of  the  notable  work  based  around  flow 
measurements as we previously discussed.
Motivation  for  automated  anomaly  detection  was 
reviewed  earlier.  An  additional  benefit  of  this  would 
present  itself  with  regards  to  network  security.  While 
ATM systems are currently  kept relatively isolated from 
external sources such as the Internet, wireless or portable 
devices,  it  is possible that  this will  change in the future  
with  an  increasing  demand  on  flexible  networking 
solutions  and  the  adoption  of  aggregated  resources  or 
outsourced services such as data centres for data back up 
or  externally  administered  Cloud  email  systems.  By 
introducing effective network monitoring and gaining an 
in-depth understanding of network resilience  through the 
systems  we  present  in  this  paper,  as  well  as  automated 
anomaly  detection,  this would more easily  allow for the 
future  integration  of  such  external  services.  This  is 
important for different reasons since it is likely in terms of 
quality, cost and security that external solutions are better 
than bespoke alternatives. It is also a motivational concern  
that  currently,  should  unauthorised  network  access  be 
achieved,  a  great  deal  of  undetected  malicious  activity 
could be performed.  However,  since  ATM networks are 
currently  isolated,  this  allows  us  to  better  model  and 
understand  the  components  involved  prior  to  the 
introduction  of  further  complexities,  including  more 
traffic types, protocols and if considering wireless access 
the increase in dropped or corrupt network packets. 
Another  possible  automation  could  be  with  regards  to 
network  failure.  As  mentioned  earlier,  ATM  power 
supplies  are  highly  resilient  and  automatically  transition 
amongst  sources  in  the  event  of  failure.  The  network 
infrastructures  also  have  high  redundancy  with  often 
numerous physical  connections to avoid loss of services. 
In  contrast,  the  current  process  of  detecting  anomalous 
network behaviour and opting to switch  infrastructure  is 
not automated. This is adequate for when it is known there  
is a fault, but not for detecting the occurrence of faults. 
We  suggest  that  this  may  not  be  sufficient  for  the 
increased  volumes  of  network  traffic  which  will  occur 
with  the  forecasted  levels  of  air  traffic.  A  potential  
automation  could  be  that  when  anomalous  behaviour 
occurred an analysis could be performed. If this problem 
was determined hazardous to operations, as specified in a 
control  policy,  the traced area  of the network where the 
problem  was  detected  could  be  isolated  or  bypassed 
allowing operations to continue unaffected. This would be 
in line with current  ATM service  policies  which outline 
delivering  fully  functioning  services  as  opposed to  fully 
functioning systems.
CONCLUSION 
In this paper,  we have highlighted the advantages of and 
motivations  for  effective  monitoring  in  ATM 
communication  networks,  and  have  presented  KSWatch 
monitoring  which  gives  network  operators  a  new 
perspective  of  their  network  which  may  provide  an 
increased  understanding  of  network  behaviour.  From 
passive measurements recorded by KSWatch,  trends and 
patterns can be observed and animated over time.  These 
measurements can be used to calculate resilience metrics 
by  simulating  potential  network  anomalies  at  various 
intensities.  We  have  shown  how  resilience  can  be 
quantified  and  visualised  in  order  for  operators  to  pre-
emptively mitigate the impact of potential threats, thereby 
increasing the reliability of their networks and, as a direct  
result, the overall resilience of the ATM service.  Finally,  
we  have  offered  informed  views  on  the  debate  of  how 
much network automation and self-management would be 
appropriate in this safety-critical environment.
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